Ukraine is in a strange situation: businesses are shouting about a lack of workers, the state is planning a 10-year migration strategy, international organizations are saying we’ll need millions of people to rebuild — and at the same time Ukrainians are wary of the idea that labor migrants from Asia or the Caucasus will start taking jobs. Let’s lay it out calmly.
Why there’s a labor shortage at all
Two big factors hit the labor market at once:
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War — mobilization, displacement, emigration. A lot of men are serving, a lot of women and families are abroad.
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Demography — the working-age population has been shrinking for years, and now the loss is about 250–300 thousand people a year.
Plus, Ukraine is entering a phase of mass reconstruction — and this is labor-hungry work: roads, bridges, utilities, housing, logistics hubs, demining-related infrastructure.
The International Labour Organization estimates: to restore the country, Ukraine will need about 8.7 million workers. That’s more than the domestic labor market can give right now.
So… will foreigners push Ukrainians out?
Short answer: no — there’s no one to push out.
Labor market experts say the same thing: the biggest “vacuum” is in working trades — builders, welders, concrete workers, bricklayers, installers, plumbers, machine operators. These are exactly the jobs that can absorb hundreds of thousands of people.
And here’s the key thought that experts remind us of: even in the “fat” pre-war years — 2006–2008 — when Ukraine had 47–48 million people and a construction boom, we still didn’t have enough builders. Now the population is closer to 30 million, the share of older people is higher — and the construction front will be much bigger because of destruction.
So if builders from, say, Indonesia or Bangladesh come, who exactly are they going to replace? There’s a physical shortage of hands.
But society is suspicious — why?
Because people remember another unfinished task: Ukraine still hasn’t fully integrated its own IDPs from 2014–2021 — housing, jobs, adaptation. So when Ukrainians are asked, “Should we invite foreigners?”, a lot of them respond: “Let’s deal with our people first.”
That’s why, when experts worked on the draft Migration Strategy until 2035, surveys showed a noticeable emotional rejection of the idea of mass attraction of foreigners — not because Ukrainians are against foreigners, but because people are afraid of unfair competition and dumping.
So the strategy is being written with three verbs in mind: attract – retain – redistribute Ukrainian labor first, and only then add foreigners where we objectively lack people.
Reality check: how many foreigners are actually working now?
Not that many.
According to the State Employment Service, work permits for foreigners fell sharply during the full-scale invasion:
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2021 – 21,786 permits
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2022 – 6,279
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2023 – 4,530
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2024 – 6,127
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Q1 2025 – 1,728
So we are not talking about some mass inflow that is flooding the labor market. On the contrary, Ukraine is still a low-pay country by global standards, so we simply can’t “pull in” hundreds of thousands of people like Poland or the Czech Republic. Wages are the main natural filter.
What the government’s line is
Some officials say directly: we shouldn’t rush to solve the labor shortage with foreigners. MP Danylo Hetmantsev, for example, points to language, legal and cultural barriers — and says priority should be to bring back Ukrainians from abroad and engage those who are economically inactive inside the country.
That’s a reasonable position: first — mobilize internal resources (IDPs, women, people 50+, retraining), and only where the gap is too large — open the gate for labor migrants.
How to bring in foreigners without creating problems
Experts outline a very pragmatic approach:
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Name priority sectors — construction, agriculture, logistics, repairs of networks, maybe care services. Not everything at once.
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Name priority countries — those where workers are used to similar conditions and where there are agencies Ukraine can trust.
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Control working and living conditions — so migrants aren’t exploited and don’t dump the market.
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Clear deportation rules — violated Ukrainian law → goodbye.
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No “European” social package — Ukraine can honestly offer legal work and earnings, not welfare. That already filters out people who just want benefits.
In this model, migrants are not competitors to Ukrainians, but a patch for labor holes that we cannot close fast enough ourselves.
The real risk is different
The real risk for Ukraine is not that foreigners will take jobs, but that we won’t have enough people to rebuild the country — and projects will be delayed, prices for services will rise, businesses will slow down because there’s no one to work.
Construction alone can “digest” several hundred thousand workers. Industry, energy repairs, municipal services, transport — also need people. And this will last for years.
Bottom line
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Ukraine has a structural labor shortage because of war and demography.
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Foreigners won’t “crowd out” Ukrainians in such conditions — there’s too much work.
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Society is right to demand: first give jobs and housing to Ukrainians, then invite others.
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The state is already preparing a migration strategy until 2035 to make it orderly, not chaotic.
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Low wages will anyway prevent a mass inflow — so fears of “millions of migrants” are exaggerated.
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If Ukraine wants to rebuild faster, a controlled, sectoral attraction of foreign workers will be needed — under state rules, not on the gray market.
That’s the grown-up answer: not “we don’t need foreigners,” and not “let everyone in,” but “we let in exactly as many as the economy can’t supply itself.”
